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CHAPTER 1!
INTRODUCTION 
 Sino-Japanese relations have experienced over two thousand years of cooperation, 
mutual cultural and economic exchange, and a parallel existence free of major military 
conflicts. In the past century, these same relations have changed into periods of war, 
destruction, and events that have caused wounds that have been hard to heal. Seventy 
years after the end of WWII, the half-century of subverted relations is still causing 
diplomatic issues and political disagreements. At the time of the first military conflicts 
between the two countries in the late nineteenth century, Japan was already more 
developed militaristically and did not refrain from manifesting it and putting the new 
army into use against its neighbors. For the Chinese empire, the humiliation experienced 
by the forceful entry of the Western powers just a few decades before these conflicts with 
Japan was already hard to bear, but an invasion from a neighboring nation, one that was 
struggling with similar threats from outside, became a trope vivid in Chinese historical 
memory up to the present day.  
Last year marked the seventieth anniversary of the end of WWII. In his speech at 
the commemoration of the anniversary, President Xi Jinping opened with the following 
words:  
“Today is a day that will forever be etched in the memory of people all over the 
world. Seventy years ago today, the Chinese people, having fought tenaciously for 
14 years, won the great victory of their War of Resistance Against Japanese 
Aggression, marking the full victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. On that day, 
the world was once again blessed by the sunshine of peace.” 
The Chinese historical narrative presents China as the victors of the war and Japan as the 
victimizers and fascist aggressor. In Japan, on the other hand, conservative voices present 
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Japan as a victim – a victim of the militaristic government, which led the nation to war in 
the first place; a victim of western colonialism; and finally, a victim of atomic bombs 
dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Chinese nationalistic-rhetorical terms, the Asian 
chapter of World War II is called “the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression,” 
whereas Japanese nationalists present it as “The Great East Asian War”. In other words, 
there is no common ground in the approach towards the past 150 years of East Asian 
history. One manifestation of this issue can be observed in the approach towards history 
textbooks in Japan, as well as the dispute about the so-called “Nanjing massacre.”1 Both 
countries refer to the past for domestic and international political reasons, which in turn 
gives legitimacy to the leaderships on a domestic level, and legitimacy of political claims 
in the international arena. The Japanese ultranationalists minimalize the extent of Japan's 
war crimes under the militarist government. In their view Japan was not the aggressor, 
but actually a victim of Western political trickery. The anti-Japanese arguments in China, 
on the other hand, legitimize the continuous rule of the Chinese Communist Party as the 
victorious faction that put an end to the Japanese invasion; to cite a commonly known 
Chinese saying, "Without the Communist Party, there would be no new China."  
 In the mid-nineteenth century, when the Western powers arrived in China and 
Japan with their full militaristic force, the realm of the two empires was self-defined as 
“all under the heaven” and would spread as far as the cultural influence of each empire 
could reach. In this way, the realm of sovereignty was defined in cultural, not nationalist, 
terms. By that time, Westerners would define their realms of power by national self-
definitions and geographic, rather than cultural, borders. The clash of civilizations has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For detailed description of these subjects see Caroline Rose 1998, 2004, 2008.
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therefore introduced the idea of nationalism, which eventually changed Chinese and 
Japanese domestic and foreign policy. From the invasion of the Western powers and the 
reopening of the two empires to the Western world, until the two countries became the 
second and the third economic powers in the world, both China and Japan underwent 
innumerable reforms, and both have struggled on their way to become modern states. But 
it is only in the present time that both countries are internally united and politically and 
economically strong. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that they keep challenging each 
other with intensified force. The key factor is that because of the economic exchanges 
between the two countries, as much as they might oppose each other politically, they are 
still bound to cooperate in order to function properly. Nevertheless, the turn of twenty-
first century has brought stronger nationalistic sentiments and more assertive foreign 
politics on both sides.  
 In a wider perspective, the Chinese Communist Party seeks its legitimacy in anti-
Japanese politics dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. For Japan, on the 
other hand, becoming a modern nation-state was connected to the Meiji Restoration that 
began in 1868. The reforms, militarization, and territorial expansion that followed 
eventually allowed the Meiji Government to renegotiate the unequal treaties with the 
Western powers, and become "the most Western country" in East Asia. During this 
process, Japan committed many deeds that even years after their occurrence are still a 
bleeding wound in the consciousness of the neighboring countries.  
For this reason, the Japanese Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is a particular case of 
historical complexity, not to mention a thorn in the side of diplomatic relations in East 
Asia. In this thesis, Yasukuni Shrine will be presented as a collective symbol that 
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encompasses most of the ideas constituting Japanese nationalism and gives proof to what 
the Chinese nationalists had to fight against. Sino-Japanese relations have a long tradition 
of the domestic issues’ impact on the international scale, and thus the rising domestic 
nationalist pressure is alarming. The domestic nationalistic interests in the case of Sino-
Japanese relations have an international dimension. Japan’s neo-nationalism calls for 
prideful national identity, which would make Japan more assertive. Should the apologetic 
diplomacy continue, the rise of China would become a grave wound for Japanese pride. 
China’s new international confidence makes the government more assertive in pushing 
for the country’s interest, and thus we can observe a “Ping-Pong” situation between 
China and Japan, where political decisions are both causes and effects of each other’s 
policies. In relation to Japanese politics, Lai Yew Meng states as follows: “Nationalism 
can influence top-level decision-making through the cohort of state-elites, namely the 
Cabinet headed by the PM. Since they act as the final arbiter of policy decision-making, 
the personalities and political dispositions/affiliations and perceptions of these key elites, 
especially the PM, tend to shape their policy preferences and influence their decision” 
(Meng, 2014). 
Where there are two opposing leaderships with nationalistic notions aimed against 
each other, there is a fertile ground for international disputes. But, what happens at the 
intersection of rising nationalism and diplomatic disputes of a historical nature? Does this 
impact only the domestic politics of its actors, or can it have a larger meaning for the 
whole international community? An old Asian proverb says: “One mountain cannot 
contain two tigers.” Can the international arena hold both China and Japan as tigers on its 
mountain? After all, we are observing disputes of opposing ideologies, which by nature 
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have no objective solution. Can ideas prevail over the presupposed “rationality” of the 
political elites in sustaining their countries at the international level, or are we at the eve 
of a larger conflict fueled by antagonistic sentiments to prepare the populations for what 
is to come? 
In search for the answers to these questions and a mechanism that could 
potentially indicate the current state of affairs, this paper will analyze the Yasukuni 
Shrine in Tokyo from the perspective of a collective symbol that it constitutes in Chinese 
and Japanese culture, which will be explained in Chapter 2 from a theoretical perspective, 
and presented in more practical form in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. This form of presentation 
will serve to show how the dispute around the visits of the Japanese Prime Ministers to 
the shrine fall into the category of axiological argumentation, which deals with disputes 
of an ideological nature and therefore cannot be resolved in terms of reconciliation. On 
the contrary, they are aimed only towards reaffirming the current animosities. There is no 
possible way of solving the disputes because of the ideological nature of the shrine; 
however, since it is a nationalistic symbol, an analysis of the discourse around it can 
provide guidelines for interpretation of the political behavior of both China and Japan. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents a case study of Yasukuni Shrine as a collective symbol in the 
Chinese media. The harsh rhetoric used by the Chinese opponents of the dispute points to 
the importance of the issue; depicts how the dispute is discursively reaffirmed in Chinese 
collective memory; and, finally, warns about the possible outcomes of the dispute’s 
escalation. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis of Sino-Japanese relations poses numerous theoretical and 
methodological problems. First of all, International Relations (IR) as an academic 
discipline does not provide a satisfactory framework that would include micro- and 
macro- levels of analysis. The main scope of the IR discipline is to provide explanations 
of the reasons for the state of affairs in international politics and to point towards 
solutions that would allow the achievement, or sustainment, of global peace. The current 
leading IR theories – neorealism and neoliberalism – concentrate predominantly on a 
systemic, macro level of analysis, overshadowing the importance of domestic-specific 
factors. On the other hand, critical theory pays extensive attention to the domestic, micro 
level of analysis, thus diminishing the importance of the overarching international 
system. Full comprehension of Sino-Japanese international relations requires the 
combination of both approaches (Rose, 1998). The author is well aware of the 
impossibility of a construction of a fully comprehensive framework without addressing 
philosophical inquiries on ontological, epistemological, and empirical levels, which 
would constitute the topic of a different research altogether. Furthermore, a full 
description of the contending approaches towards the discipline of international relations 
is a topic for a separate analysis itself. Therefore, this chapter will examine only the 
relevant paradigms necessary to demarcate some of the issues at stake and present the 
approach taken in this paper.  
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Micro/Macro analysis in IR 
According to neorealists, following Kenneth Watlz’s Theory of International 
Politics in particular, “power” is the supreme category in world politics and its 
achievement is an inevitable cause of conflicts among the actors of the international 
arena. The nature of international relations is defined by its ordering principle – anarchy. 
The states – the basic analytical units – act according to their interests that are aimed 
toward securing the power balance and they will put their own interests above those of 
the other states2. In this framework, survival is the core interest of all states. There is no 
central authority that could enforce rules on the actors of the international arena which 
creates the anarchical nature of the whole system. The states that are part of the system 
are formally equal, but the difference between them lays in the unequal disposition of 
capabilities. The relative capabilities are the base for the pursuit of the states’ own 
interests, and the assessment of the relative gains and losses ensures the final balance of 
power. One of the problems with this approach is that it creates the so-called “security 
dilemma” in which the states are never sure of the other states’ intentions and interests, 
and therefore they develop military power to assure their relative power on the 
international arena. The security dilemma is a vicious cycle, where one state arms fearing 
a possible invasion by the other one, which in response resorts to arming itself for 
conflicts, and so on. 
In the case of Sino-Japanese relations, the security dilemma can be observed 
when the rising power of China creates a threat to Japan. Japan, as a result, tries to 
override the peace clause of its Constitution, and thus allows China to justify its further 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Disambiguation!of!the!terms!nation,!state,!and!nation4state,!will!be!provided!in!the!following!sections.!
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armament. Critiques of neorealist theories argue that this approach has an embedded 
premise of the unavoidability of war, which makes the achievement of global peace 
impossible. 
Neoliberals, on the other hand, while acknowledging the anarchical nature of the 
international system, concentrate more on the way in which states can cooperate within 
the system in order to pursue their interests and achieve absolute gains. The relative gains 
are related only to power balance, while the absolute gains include economic and cultural 
aspects. This theory aims more to explain the possible ways in which a state can 
cooperate in the anarchical system in order to achieve mutual gains. The lack of war 
between China and Japan, in this perspective, is related to economic cooperation, and the 
need of stable relations between the two countries in order to fully benefit from the trade 
relations that is the core – peace-securing – interest for both sides. On the top diplomatic 
level, both China and Japan seem to opt for cooperation, and efforts aimed towards 
maintaining stabilized relations can be observed. However, the public discourse on both 
sides of the East China Sea is imbued with antagonistic, nationalistic sentiments, 
resulting occasionally in protests and boycotts that work against economic cooperation. 
The concentration on a systemic-level approach of the two mainstream theories 
creates an epistemological problem, which issues from the fact that those theories are not 
analytically adapted for analysis of non-material factors and variables, such as culture, 
identity, or ideology. By treating states as a given basic-unit, these theories overlook their 
social character and the social construction of the state’s identities, arguing that these 
aspects are of lesser importance. In the international arena, states do act as separate units, 
and therefore a systemic analytical approach is needed. However, the existence of states 
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is also bound to the existence of the nations that constitute them, meaning that the 
systemic analysis is an insufficient form of holistic evaluation. One can find stateless 
nations that impact the international arena (i.e. Kurds or Basks), but there are no 
nationless states. In a globalized world, free of the Cold War bipolarization of power, a 
state-based framework is not fully efficient. Furthermore, the international corporations, 
institutions or organizations do not act towards the interests of the states, but rather for 
the gains of states’ populations, whether it involves military truces, defense of human 
rights, or simply capitalistic profit. If we consider the international dimension of 
nationalism as an ideology, which presents the interests of a certain nation as superior to 
those of other nations, then with its growth in power on a domestic level, it is hard to 
deny its consequences in the international arena.  
A further approach to international relations is derived from the area studies 
discipline. In contrast to the above, the area studies approach seeks to explain 
international relations mainly through country-specific factors, history, and political 
culture, which once again distances the analysis from the factors specific to the systemic 
level of the international arena. While we cannot completely discount the area studies 
approach as a useful tool of analysis, it is ultimately too narrow in its scope. In the Sino-
Japanese case, it is useful to observe the Confucian and Neo-Confucian political 
traditions, or the specific approach towards hierarchy and respect. But after all, despite 
the possible domestically-specific cultural or political solutions deriving from a given 
culture, in the end that culture is part of the international system, subject to global 
influences, whether it likes it or not.  
10 
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Given the problems inherent in the above international relations theoretical 
approaches, the overarching analytical paradigm applied in this thesis is constructivism, 
and social constructivism in particular. Social constructivism will be examined in more 
detail below, but a brief rationale for this choice will be explained here: constructivist 
epistemology allows for the simultaneous (micro-level) explanation of the socio-political 
concepts of identity, historical memory, and nationalism, as well as their role in the 
international system (macro-level). As Anthony D. Smith astutely puts it: “No memory, 
no identity. No identity, no nation.”  
Although constructivism is one of the commonly accepted paradigms for the 
purpose of the analysis of international relations, following the approach of Alexander 
Wendt (1999): “constructivism is not a theory of international politics,” and therefore it 
will be used only as an epistemology aimed towards a more eclectic approach to the 
analysis of Sino-Japanese international relations encompassing viable solutions and 
approaches derived from other theories and disciplines. Finally, since the main purpose of 
this paper is to reconstruct the axiological basis (defined in detail below) of the 
nationalistic-ideological discourse in Sino-Japanese relations, constructivism will serve to 
explain the reasons for such an endeavor and the implications of this process.  
Ideas in IR 
Another problem in IR is a divide in approach towards the variables that influence 
political outcomes. The supporters of the leading schools, taking states as the primary 
analytical unit, find the influential variables in material ones, such as the physical 
capabilities of the countries, technological achievements, geographical advantages, and 
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relative power (neorealism), or economic interdependence, and the level of international 
institutionalization (neoliberalism). At the same time, both schools consider ideological 
variables, like ideas, customs, norms, and identities, as epiphenomenal. Indeed, the 
material variables can be quantified, and depending on the paradigm of the approach, 
value can be attached to them in order to compare, contrasts, and draw conclusions from 
the relative situation. This gives more viability to the first two approaches as social 
science’s theories. The ideological variables, which, on the other hand, are difficult to 
define, and non-quantifiable in their nature, do not fall into a clear framework for analysis 
in the IR perspective, but the difficulties in definition of ideas do not strip them of 
analytical potential in the international arena. As a matter of fact, culture and identity 
may be the core of many policy-making decisions’ explanations. Judith Goldstein and 
Robert O. Keohane (1993) refer to a particular situation that addresses this problem: “In 
situations where there are no objective criteria of action on which to base one’s choices, 
political elites may settle on courses of action on the basis of shared cultural, normative, 
religious, ethnic, or casual beliefs.” These shared beliefs (ideas) of any form are found in 
nations in the form of social constructs. The interests to which both neorealists and 
neoliberals refer are formed on the basis of such shared beliefs. As Alexander Wendt 
(1999) famously put it: “[a] world in which identities and interests are learned and 
sustained by intersubjectively grounded practice is one in which ‘anarchy is what states 
make of it,’” pointing to the fact that even if we acknowledge the anarchic nature of the 
international system, we also have to realize that it is not an arbitrary state of matters 
given a priori, but rather a final effect of other processes. In the radical words of Robert 
Jackson (1993): “‘Ideas’ and ‘interests’ are in my view both concepts and therefore 
12 
!
‘ideas.’” Therefore, the states’ interests are not inherent but rather created according to 
the ideological dispositions. In an idealistic – utopian – case of the international arena, 
where all the actors’ core interest is global peace, and not survival, certain material 
variables related to relative power, would cease to exist. But once an idea (or interest) 
becomes part of the political line, it is institutionalized for the purpose of its 
implementation and propagation, and in turn becomes part of the self-reproducing 
system. Zheng Wang (Wang, 2012, p. ix) highlights this in the following passage:  
“Institutionalization is the process of embedding particular values and norms 
within an organization, social system, or society [. . . ] [obtaining] lasting impact 
for generations to come. Furthermore, once a policy choice leads to creation of 
reinforcing organizational and normative structures, the policy idea can affect the 
incentives of political entrepreneurs long after the interests of its initial 
proponents have changed.”  
In other words, although not as apparent as the material factors and capabilities, ideas 
might as well be of a higher importance for the sake of the international arena than the 
mainstream theories would assume. The analytical framework of the mainstream theories 
does not treat some of the most horrific events of human history in terms of international 
relations. Many of the genocides of the twentieth century occurred on the ideological 
basis and not in regard to materialistic capabilities, between nations that did not have 
their separate states. A good example of such events would be the Tutsi/Hutu genocide in 
Rwanda, or the Bosnian Srebrenica genocide. Interestingly enough the!International 
Tribunal ruled that the Bosnian event was a genocide, basing their claims in accordance 
with the international law.   
A quote from Alexander Wendt is useful in summing up the paradigmatic 
differences of approaches towards international relations:  
13 
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“Neorealists see the structure of the international system as a distribution of 
material capabilities because they approach their subject with a materialist lens; 
Neoliberals see it as capabilities plus institutions because they have added to the 
material base an institutional superstructure; and constructivists see it a 
distribution of ideas because they have and idealist ontology” (Wendt, 1999).  
Since the topic of this thesis refers to ideological discourse, the author finds 
constructivism as the most suitable paradigm for the analysis of Sino-Japanese relations. 
Additionally, the premises of social constructivism in relation to system theory and 
communication, explained below, serve to portray the importance of ideas and their 
possible role in the international arena. 
Social constructivism 
To support the claim that ideas can matter in international relations, there is a 
need for an understanding of social systems first. For this purpose, let us analyze the 
theoretical approach proposed by social constructivists.  
According to Niklas Luhmann: “society is not composed of human beings, it is 
composed of the communication among human beings” (Luhmann, 1990). Modern 
society is therefore understood as a system of communications that is differentiated into a 
network of subsystems. Each of these systems reproduces itself recursively through 
communication on the basis of its own, system-specific operations. The systems observe 
themselves and their environment, but whatever they observe is created through unique, 
subjective perspective, because of the subjective selectivity used for their observations. 
That selectivity is an embedded nature of social systems that serves the purpose of the 
reduction of complexity, without which the systems would not be able to exist. The self-
observation of psychical systems involves consciousness, but that of social systems needs 
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communication (Luhman, 1995). A state does not have consciousness and cannot observe 
its own actions or decisions; it is only through communication within the state that it can 
observe itself. Luhmann defines communication as a synthesis of three selections: 
information (a selection from a repertoire of referential possibilities), utterance (a 
selection from a repertoire of intentional acts), and understanding (the observation of the 
distinction between utterance and information) (Luhman, 1995). The distinction between 
information and utterance is entirely immanent with regard to the autopoiesis of a system 
that employs this particular schema to process complexity in the form of meaning. The 
social construction of meaning occurs in social systems through the process of 
communication. An important concept at the basis of this premise – autopoiesis – was 
coined as a result of neuorobiological research led by Humberto Maturana and Francis 
Varela concerning perception in living systems. According to Maturana, autopoiesis 
defines and explains the nature and the way of functioning of all of the living systems. 
An autopoietic system is autonomous, recursively self-reproductive and operationally 
closed, in the sense that there are sufficient amounts of processes within it to maintain it 
as the whole, and these processes are inaccessible from outside. Thus, for radical 
constructivists, any knowledge or understanding of the reality outside of the autopoietic 
system is a subjective interpretation, rather than an observation of the objective “actual” 
phenomenon. As Luhmann puts it: “Reality, then, may be an illusion, but the illusion 
itself is real” (Luhman, 1995).  
The reproduction of living systems like cells is based on chemical processes; the 
brain, on the other hand, works with neurophysiological impulses. By contrast, systems 
that operate on the basis of consciousness (psychic systems) or communication (social 
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systems) require meaning for their reproduction. Luhmann defines meaning as the 
“horizon” of all the possibilities. Meaning resides in the self-referential structure of a 
consciousness that consists solely in and through its autopoietic operations and that, in 
selecting from a self-generated horizon of surplus references, reproduces that horizon 
without ever exhausting its possibilities or transgressing its boundaries. Since social 
systems cannot be derived from a subject, psychic and social systems must be considered 
as two separate autopoietic systems, each of which draws its boundaries on the basis of 
its own systemic operations and conditions of connectivity and, in so doing, demarcates 
what constitutes the environment for that system. In fact, the two systems emerge 
together, as the consciousness emerges together with and encourages the formation of 
social systems. 
 In other words, according to Luhmann, society is the all-encompassing social 
system that orders all possible communication among human beings. The political system 
is one of its subsystems, alongside other subsystems for religion, science, economy, 
education, family life, and medical care, among others. The individual subsystems 
actualize society from their specific perspective according to correspondingly specific 
system/environment referential frameworks (Luhmann, 1990). A system is called self-
referential that produces and reproduces the elements – in this case political decisions – 
out of which it is itself composed. The final goal of a system is to sustain itself through 
the process of self-reproduction. In the case of economy, the self-reproductive nature of 
the system can be depicted by a fact that the neoliberals point out: namely the 
interdependence of international economic relations. Two countries, even if they differ 
ideologically in regard to politics, will still sustain economic relations, despite being part 
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of different political systems (for example China and the United States). The legal system 
is the best example of the autopoiesis as it is composed of legislations that create new 
legislations in order to secure the legislative system in general. In political terms, the state 
is then a means of the self-description of the political system of society (Luhmann, 1990). 
The constructivist analysis allows us to understand the set of ideological 
presuppositions that defines the subjects, whether individual or collective. By observing 
the communication and the simplification of the systems’ external complexity in the form 
of axiomatic social constructs, we can observe the meanings underlying them, and thus 
observe the processes of self-reproduction. To relate these assumptions back to the IR 
framework, Alexander Wendt’s quote comes in handy again: “the structures of human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces. The 
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather 
than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999). 
Nationalism 
Despite the rising popularity of the voices proclaiming the end of nations due to 
the progressing development of globalizing forces and the high level of global 
interdependence, the system of world politics is an “inter-national” system, and thus it 
includes nations. Nationalism is therefore bound to become the topic of analysis for the 
scholars interested in the mechanisms guiding the international system, but a framework 
encompassing its domestic and international impact is needed for such an endeavor. In 
the light of the previously explained theoretical approach, nation is a social system and 
nationalism is the communication, or the discourse, used to reproduce it. The fluidity and 
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multiplicity of the meanings of ‘nation’ enable nationalism to achieve social 
reproduction, both at the level of individual nations and of the modern world system.  
Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political 
(state) and the national (nation) unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983, str. 1).3 As 
Hugh Seton-Watson (1977) once addressed the definition of nation: “[. . .] I am driven to 
the conclusion that no “scientific” definition of the nation can be devised, yet the 
phenomenon has existed and exists.” Benedict Anderson (1991) argues that nations are 
“imagined communities,” which supports the claim that nations are social systems, as it 
can be reinterpreted in social constructivist terms in the form of “nations are social 
constructs.” What is more, the importance of nationalism is often completely overlooked 
by mainstream IR theories, which treat it as a variable of merely domestic importance. 
Although nationalism as an ideology related to nation impacts primarily domestic politics 
rather than international politics, domestic issues can also become part of foreign policy 
decision-making. Nationalist pressure coming from domestically important political 
actors can effectively constrain a state’s behavior. An example of such a situation would 
be in the case where political elites are dependent on nationalism for their legitimacy, and 
the domestic political system is characterized by a strong connection between the 
political elites and the masses (Meng, 2014).  
On the psychological level, nationalism gives an identity and unifies people. 
Nation includes socio-cultural and psychological dimensions, namely “the objective 
features of language, culture, religion and common descent that form the basis of a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!To overcome ambiguities in definitions of state, nation, and nation-state, in what follows the author, 
following the previously mentioned Gellner’s definition of nationalism and Luhmann’s definition of the 
state, uses nation-state as the combination of the political/communicative entity –  state, and the 
cultural/social entity – nation.! 
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collective identity, and the subjective element of consciousness, passion and affection 
towards the perceived shared identity” (Zheng, 1999). The thought that others believe in 
the same values and are willing to defend them plays an important role in a 
globalized/globalizing world, as it reassures the members of the smaller community that 
they are not alone and will not perish without support. At the same time, through the 
embedded national mythology, nationalism creates a sense of superiority, which can fuel 
conflicts. The positive sense of “us” as the community fuels the feeling of superiority of 
that community, which eventually can result in treatment of “them,” not belonging to the 
nation, as inferior. Furthermore, one of the earlier definitions of the subject by Hans 
Kohn (1939) also identifies the psychological dimension of nationalism which as “‘a state 
of mind’ [. . . ] recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and 
the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being.”!
It is a concept that “compromises ‘institution’ and ‘identity,’ two crucial components of 
the nation-state. It is not important when expressed by individuals, but only when 
expressed collectively by institutions” (Zheng, 1999).  
Considering “the dark” chapters of the modern history of both China and Japan— 
the recent rise of Chinese relative power and their more assertive approach towards 
diplomacy, as well as the Japanese attempts to redefine the Constitution in order to 
reintroduce a national army—the increase in nationalistic expressions becomes alarming 
in terms of regional security. The ongoing disputes relating to the Japanese history 
textbooks, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes and the criticism of the officials’ visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine represent Chinese newly developed confidence in the international 
arena, which is provoking Japan to take a harder stance in its own diplomatic approach. 
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On the other hand, Japan’s revisionism of history and attempts to redefine the 
constitution in favor of possible armament raise fears of preparation for another 
militaristic conflict. The nationalistic sentiments aimed against each other just fuel the 
tensions, resulting in increased public support of more active and aggressive foreign 
policy in both countries. Neither the neorealist nor the neoliberalist approaches can 
explain this state of matter alone. A quarter of a century after the collapse of the Cold 
War’s “Iron Curtain,” the international balance of power is quite different, and it does not 
fit into the dichotomized explanations of world politics coined during the Cold War. 
Some of the reasons for the present possible instability of power across the globe derive 
from Sino-Japanese relations. East Asia is a region where crucial political and economic 
interests of the three biggest economies in the world intersect, which in terms of 
contemporary economic interdependence means that the nationalistic sentiments can have 
global impact. The triad of the US-China-Japan political and economic relations is 
particularly interesting in as much as it represents almost half of the world’s nominal 
GDP, with almost 2 billion inhabitants (almost 30% of the world population), and three 
of the top four military powers according to the Credite Suisse’s Military Strength Index.4 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016 Fact Sheet (for 
2015)5 out of the world’s total 1,676 billion dollars spend on military, half of it (852) is 
spent by the US (596), China (215), and Japan (40.9) only. Thus, instability in relations 
between these countries could result in a military conflict of unprecedented scale, but 
also, because of ideological disputes, it can influence the global economy. Disruption in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Credite Suisse Research Institute report “The End of Globalization or a more Multipolar World?”, 
September 2015 
 
5 http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf [accessed on 5/8/2016]!
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economic relations between China, Japan, and the United States could cause insufferable 
damage to the world economy in general. Although the development of the international 
interdependencies in recent decades has progressed immensely, there is still no 
supranational authority that could execute its power over nation-states. Furthermore, the 
international organizations and treaties are just agreements, and not physical boundaries. 
The role of nations thus remains important in political discourse, which is manifested in 
the popularity of nationalist parties across the world in general. The negative aspects of 
globalization help to reaffirm the positive nationalistic notions of those who want their 
own country to prosper, regardless of the international economic interdependencies. 
Indeed, when a nation is facing pressures of globalization, the nationalistic narratives and 
the historical memory narration inspire patriotism and evoke feelings of solidarity. The 
case of Sino-Japanese relations proves this point. Nationalism has been a historically-
grounded factor defining bilateral relations, and through its institutionalization it shapes 
the current relations and influences the foreign policy decision-making to the present day. 
Axiological Argumentation 
The main purpose of this thesis is to reconstruct the axiological basis of the 
Chinese ideological – nationalistic – discourse in Sino-Japanese relations. Nationalistic 
discourse is created around disputable issues of a political or ethical nature, which are 
subjects of axiological argumentation. Axiological argumentation is a form of 
argumentation in which the audience’s task is to decide whether the proposed argument is 
sound or unsound in relation to the value system of the audience’s given culture. In the 
case of the Japanese Prime Minister’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the aim of the 
axiologically based arguments is to validate the visits as just or unjust. This occurs by 
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relating to culture’s axiological basis, or simply put, set of commonly known and 
accepted beliefs. Since according to Chaim Perelman (Perelman, 2004) there is no 
universal objective truth, the only way to validate the argument is by refereeing it to a 
general axiological base – the referential framework – subjective by being culture-
specific. Only an understanding of the specificity of the context and culturally dependent 
set of interpretants allows us therefore to understand the justifications of the arguments.  
In axiological discourse, from the perspective of the proponent, the best choice of 
materials for the argument is based on “cultural objects,” which constitutes the 
axiological base of a given culture. These objects are a set of widely accepted, culturally 
enrooted sets of beliefs, evaluations, or preferences – found in collective symbols. 
Collective symbols are universals operating in a particular culture. Each culture extracts 
and evaluates these collective symbols as representations of beliefs. Michael Fleischer 
defines them as follows: 
“Collective symbol” is a set of signs with intricate and fully developed 
interpretant. For this reason they manifest the cultural meanings, depending on the 
particular manifestation of the culture, as well as strong positive or negative 
values shared by the entire given culture, hence they give a frame of reference for 
differentiation of values. In order to properly interpret a collective symbol, the 
interpreter needs to have a particular knowledge regarding the semiotic and (most 
importantly) the signifying aspects of the interpretant. This knowledge is acquired 
both through culturally-influenced process of socialization, as well as by means of 
communication within the culture's discourse, which allows the participant to 
adequately communicate in his interdiscourse. The cultural meaning is most often 
quite different from the lexical, linguistic one. The collective symbols are the 
most important elements of interdiscourse” (Fleischer, 2002). 
According to Michael Fleischer, collective symbols are internally differentiated and 
consist of three counterparts: 
a) kernel, very stable, functionally responsible for consistency of the symbol and 
its anchoring in a given culture; 
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b) up-to-date area, responsible for the particular meaning in the society of a given 
culture; 
 
c) connotative area, responsible for the dependency of the symbol on the natural 
language and lexical meanings. (Fleischer, 2007) 
 
There is also a subclass of collective symbols, which are called ideological objects. They 
differ from the collective symbols because even within the same culture they can adapt 
different designations. This has the potential to create competing ideological systems in 
which they are evaluated differently. Typically, any real, individual object has an 
unlimited number of parameters, and for this reason, the crux of the argument lays in a 
particular reduction of these parameters and their subsequent evaluation. A biased 
selection of parameters, transforming collective symbols into ideological ones, can 
change entirely the reference to the ideological space. In accordance with this premise 
“Yasukuni” is a cultural object, or as we have established – a collective symbol -- that 
through different ideological attributions becomes an ideological symbol. The biased 
selection of the parameters in regard to Yasukuni can thus allow for a construction of a 
sound argument in favor of the official visits on behalf of the proponents, as well as a 
similarly sound argument against this kind of visit on behalf of the opponents. Yasukuni 
can at the same time refer to pride, glory, and honor, as well as horror, shame and regret.  
A fully comprehensive reconstruction of the axiological basis at the core of Sino-
Japanese disputes would require a detailed analysis of the use of the axioms in the 
argumentative discourse of all the political issues between China and Japan on both sides 
in both languages, which is not at stake in this research. Instead, focusing in particular on 
the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the author will reconstruct the collective symbol in relation to 
the problems it causes in an international arena. For this purpose, Chapter 3 will 
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concentrate on the kernel of the collective symbol by describing how it is rooted in 
Chinese and Japanese cultural in historical perspective; Chapter 4 will provide the 
analysis of the symbol’s up-to-date area, or in other words, the meanings that the symbol 
acquires by different ideological attributions; Chapter 5 will analyze the connotative area 
of the symbol by presenting some of the possible arguments used in the ideological 
disputes; and, finally, Chapter 6 will present a case study related to the symbol’s usage 
and rhetoric around it in articles from People’s Daily in regard to Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo’s visit to the shrine in December of 2013.  
The main argument of the paper can be presented as follows: the analysis of Sino-
Japanese ideological discourse in relation to Yasukuni Shine will identify the underlying 
axiological basis, understood as the set of beliefs commonly accepted and taken for 
granted by each of the cultures in which they are embedded. These sets of beliefs are in 
the author’s view tantamount with the social constructs at the core of both of the 
societies, and, thus, they can provide guidelines for understanding the political-
nationalistic identities, which shed light on the possible reactions of the states on the 
international arena.  
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CHAPTER III 
YASUKUNI: THE KERNEL 
In order to better understand the international reactions caused by the official 
visits of the Japanese Prime Minister (PM) or the members of his cabinet to the shrine, it 
is crucial to understand the multiplicity of issues, controversies, ideological attributions 
and emotions that Yasukini evokes. For this purpose, it is beneficial to first answer the 
question of: What is Yasukuni? Although the question seems quite simple, depending on 
the perspective taken, it is subject to many contending answers and understandings. In 
terms of the previously presented framework of the analysis of axiological 
argumentation, the following chapter will first present the Yasukuni shrine as an object 
belonging to “reality” –free of communications—that belongs already to the socially 
constructed “actuality.” While identifying some of the collective symbols present at the 
shrine by providing the knowledge of the context, some examples of their usage in the 
connotative area will follow. Finally, the next chapter will answer the question of how 
Yasukuni becomes an overall collective symbol.  
Yasukuni – object of reality 
Yasukuni Shrine was established in 1869. Nowadays, Yasukuni is a “touristic” 
destination, in as much as it receives approximately 8 million visitors per year 
(Harootunian, 1999, p. 150). From an objective perspective of someone without the 
culture-specific contextual knowledge, it is first and foremost a complex of buildings 
situated in the center of Japan’s capital, right outside the Imperial Palace moat. The 
shrine’s topographical placement allows an unaware tourist to find himself on the 
premises of the complex without the intention to visit it.  At the entrance to the complex 
25 
!
there is the stone pillar with the inscription of “” (	 Yasukuni,”
	 Jinja, “shrine”), which already identifies the place as a shrine, but to understand the 
engravings some kind of linguistic knowledge is already required. Then, there is the 
imposing Daiichi Torii,6 (“First Shrine Gate or the Great Gate”), the tallest of its kind. 
For a visitor without the cultural specific knowledge, the torii gate may be overlooked 
and treated as a decorative kind of metal construction. It is in fact the first collective 
symbol present at the shrine that represents Shintoism. It marks the boundary between the 
terrestrial and spiritual realm, and refers to a long-lasting tradition of placing this kind of 
structure in front of temples, shrines, and other areas of spiritual importance. Thus with 
proper identification of the symbol, Yasukuni transforms from a merely architectonic 
structure (object of reality) to a place of spiritual importance (object of socially 
constructed actuality). 
On the immediate right of the first torii gate, the visitors can find a monument in 
memory of the Hitachi Maru Incident, an event that took place during the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-1905, in which three Japanese transporter ships were sunk by the Russian 
fleet. Walking further down, one passes by the first western-style statue in Japan, or the 
statue of “the Father of Modern Japanese Army”– Omura Masujiro (1824-1869),7 who 
introduced western military training not only to samurai, but also to the commoners. 
Omura is further an important figure in that he argued for the abolishment of the feudal 
army and the samurai class, as well as the introduction of national military conscription. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Torii – specifically shaped gate is usually found at the entrance to a Shinto shrine, but also at the entrence 
to other religious spaces. 
 
7 http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/precinct/statue3.html [access on May 7th 2016]!
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Although Omura did not live to see the introduction of the reforms he supported, having 
died as a result of a pro-samurai ambush, the legacy of his ideas marked the beginning of 
militaristic reform in Meiji Japan. The two monuments bring to the foreground yet 
another symbol – loyalty in the form of military service, which at Yasukuni Shrine serves 
the commemorative function of a memorial place dedicated to the war dead who gave up 
their lives for the nation, manifested in the monuments in honor of war heroes. 
Finally, the visitor to Yasukuni arrives to the main complex marked by the biggest 
bronze torii gate in Japan – the Daini Torii (“Second Shrine Gate”), dating back to 1887; 
and a cypress gate adorned with 1.5 meter wide, sixteen-petal chrysanthemums seals, the 
official mon8 of the Imperial house, on its doors – the Shinmon (“Main Gate”). At this 
point one more purpose of the complex can be identified, namely the link to the Imperial 
house in form of the usage of the chrysanthemum mon.  
Crossing the main gate brings the visitor to a cherry tree garden with a Nogakudo 
– a Noh theater—on the right. Noh dramas and traditional Japanese dance are performed 
on its stage in honor of the resident divinities, whereas the cherry blossoms are related to 
the long tradition of Japanese affection towards this particular kind of tree. According to 
Yasukuni’s official website: “Each year, the Japan Meteorological Agency bases its 
cherry blossom flowering forecasts on the cherry trees at Yasukuni Shrine,”9 which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Japanese form of coat of arms. Chrysanthemum mon is used either only by the Emperor himself, or on 
items that represent Emperor’s authority, like the Diet members’ pins and orders, or the front of the 
Japanese passport’s cover.  
 
9 http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/precinct/cherrytrees.html [access on May 7th 2016] 
 
27 
!
further points to the importance of the place for Japan in general.10  Several teahouses, a 
Japanese garden, and a sumo ring can also be found within the boundaries of Yasukuni’s 
premises. As John Breen points out: “At the early stage it [Yasukuni] was a place of 
respect and veneration, but also, for the purpose of dissemination of the concepts it stood 
for, it was also a place of entertainment” (Breen, Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the 
Struggle for Japan's Past, 2008). 
 From here the path open to the visitor is twofold: in front, there is the final torii 
gate behind which Haiden – the Main Hall, and Honden – the Main Shrine, are found; 
whereas to the right the visitors can find the Yushukan – the controversial museum 
presenting relics of the wars in which Japan took part; Yasukuni archives – which collect 
data related to the life and circumstances of the death of the Yasukuni deities; the 
Monument of Dr. Pal, added in 2005, which honors the only Asian judge at the 
International Tribunal for the Far East, and the only one who insisted that all defendants 
were not guilty (In his opinion American and Britain were the real aggressors and not the 
Japanese); and finally, the Statue of War Widow with Children – “a tribute to the many 
war widows who did such a fine job of raising their children in the face of incredible 
hardship and loneliness.”11  
Aside from the main complex, three more buildings require particular attention: 
the Reijibo Hoanden (“the Repository for the Symbolic Registers of Divinities”), situated 
behind the main shrine, where the list of names of all the deities worshipped at Yasukuni 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 More on the symbolism and cultural importance of the cherry blossoms in relation to Yasukuni in the 
chapter 4. 
 
11 http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/precinct/statue1.html [access on May 7th 2016] 
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Shrine is kept; the Motomiya (“the Original Shrine”) hidden on the left side of the Main 
Shrine, apparently the prototype of the current Yasukuni Shrine moved to Tokyo from 
Kyoto, where it was originally established by imperial loyalists at the end of Tokugawa 
period; and the Chinreisha – “Spirit-Pacifying Shrine,” right next to the Original Shrine, 
which was built in 1965 to console the souls of everyone who died in wars fought 
anywhere in the World. 
 It is the story and symbolism of these structures, behind the Main Gate, that are 
the main subject of the domestic and international controversies. Should Yasukuni be 
only a Shinto shrine with the intention to commemorate the war dead under the austerities 
of the Imperial House, such a place would not raise much criticism. “National war 
memorial” is a universally accepted norm, and state officials have a moral duty to visit 
such memorials (Meng, 2014). Most of the countries across the world have places of 
similar purpose that are also religious sites – for example the Arlington Cemetery in the 
United States. After all, rituals regarding the dead are usually held on religious grounds 
or in observance of religious traditions. Commemoration of the fallen in battles is, after 
all, a common practice for the leaders of modern nations. Yasukuni, though, is much 
more than just a place of remembrance. In fact, the Yasukuni issue contains controversies 
of a religious, ideological, political, and historical nature as well as conflicting 
perceptions towards history and identity. In Takashi Mikuriya’s (Matsumoto, Mikuriya i 
Sakamoto, 2005)words, the problem of Yasukuni is a ‘simultaneous equation’ of all of 
these aspects. 
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Yasukuni – collective symbol 
At the time of its establishment in 1869, Yasukuni Shrine, initially called Tōkyō 
Shōkonsha (, "shrine to summon the souls") was intended to be a memorial 
monument commemorating those who gave up their lives for the Japanese newly-born 
nation. Indeed, the first 7,000 souls or so enshrined at Yasukuni were the souls of the 
imperial loyalist soldiers who fell during the Boshin War – the Japanese civil war 
between the forces of the Tokugawa shogunate and the supporters of the revival of the 
Imperial Court. The current name – Yasukuni Jinja (!“shrine to protect the peace 
of the nation”) was established only in 1879. By then the shrine’s pantheon included the 
kami (spirits) of the fallen in the first overseas expedition of modernizing Japan – the 
Taiwan invasion of 1874. The following venerations of a bigger scale were related to the 
international military conflicts in which Japan had entered at the turn of the century, 
namely the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), 13,000 souls; and the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-5), 89,000 souls. Sadly, the larger amount of casualties was a fertile ground for 
usage of Shinto to further propagate the narrative of the “glorious war dead” and solidify 
culturally the importance of the Shrine in the public life of modern Japan. The real big 
numbers though are related to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1941), 191,000 
souls; and the Pacific War (1941-1945), over 2 million souls, which accounts for over 
85% of all the souls enshrined at Yasukuni in total.  
With the end of the WWII, in accordance with the provisions of the Shinto 
Directive, the official relations of the State and Shinto, including funding, were put to an 
end. “Section j)” of the Directive requires particular attention: “The use in official 
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writings of the terms ‘Greater East Asia War,’ ‘The Whole World under One Roof,’ and 
all other terms whose connotation in Japanese is inextricably connected with State 
Shinto, militarism, and ultra-nationalism is prohibited and will cease immediately” (The 
Shinto Directive, 1960). Such phrasing was not repeated in later regulations, thus 
allowing Yushukan war museum to use the controversial term “Greater East Asia War.”  
In the early post-war period, even with the enacted provisions of the Shinto 
Directive, Yasukuni was very lucky. First of all, despite the American bombings of 
Tokyo, which destroyed the city and killed at least 100,000 citizens, Yasukuni survived 
intact (Breen, Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the Struggle for Japan's Past, 2008). 
Secondly, with the cutting off of state funding, the future of the shrine was very 
uncertain; still as Breen (2008) points out: the Yasukuni Worshippers’ Society (Yasukuni 
jinja hosankai) includes “an imperial princess as president, a former Foreign minister as 
vice-president and a former Prime Minister and company presidents as consultants, [so] it 
is not surprising that fundraising [for the shrine] proved highly successful.” The subject 
of national-mythmaking, was apparently too precious to let it perish in ruins. 
In the years after the Occupation, Yasukuni shifted from the center of attention, 
but was never forgotten or neglected. All prime ministers of the Liberal Democratic Party 
since 1945, except Takeshita Noboru, attended the spring and autumn festivals celebrated 
at the shrine. The illegality of prime minister’s visits has been challenged every year in 
the Diet, and the petitions for renewed state support of the Yasukuni Shrine started as 
early as 1956 (Hardacre, 1989). The year 1978 marks a date that meant a lot for the future 
of Yasukuni, since it was in 1978 that the secret enshrinement of Class-A War Criminals 
occurred. This single event is fiercely criticized, and constitutes the main reason for the 
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official visits at Yasukuni, as at least rhetorically speaking, it opens ground to a whole 
new level of arguments for the Chinese side.  
In the early 2000’s, during his electoral campaign, Junichiro Koizumi publically 
promised to pay tribute at the shrine every year of his term in office. After becoming the 
prime minister, he indeed paid visits every year between 2001 and 2006, which resulted 
with suspended diplomatic relations with China. Since then, the last time Yasukuni made 
it to the headlines of newspapers across the globe was in relation to Abe Shinzo’s visit to 
the shrine on December 13th 2013. In order to provide a perspective on ideological 
attributions towards Yasukuni that occur in Chinese nationalistic discourse, the Chinese 
reactions in regard to this visit published in People’s Daily will be further analyzed as a 
case study in Chapter 6. The following chapter will present the meanings of Yasukuni, 
which although presented separately, are all intertwined, and should be acknowledged 
together. It is precisely because of the interaction between them that Yasukuni emerges as 
a collective symbol and the controversies around the shrine arise.  
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CHAPTER IV 
YASUKUNI: UP-TO-DATE AREA 
In a political sense, history is not facts, but rather their interpretations. It is not 
what happened that matters, but what the events can mean, and how they can be used. 
History can be used as the fuel for the creation of an identity. As Gillis points out, 
memory is also a subjective phenomenon (Gillis, 1994). In regard to the previously 
explained theoretical framework, it is the discourse of the historical subsystem. Historical 
memory is in this case “the lens which gives understanding and interpretation in approach 
to conflict resolution” (Wang, 2012). As pointed out in the introduction, contemporary 
Sino-Japanese relations, despite official stabilization, are witnessing numerous events 
resulting in rhetorical disputes that by referring to culture-specific sets of collective 
symbols allow the proponents of the arguments to ignite emotional – nationalistic –
reactions.  In the case of Sino-Japanese relations, the core of the nationalistic disputes 
lays in the approach to history adopted by the opposing sides, in particular to issues of 
memory.  
As the history proves, the politics of memory has been a crucial tool in political 
transition throughout the world, and the East Asian powers conform to this tendency. The 
resurgence of radical nationalism in East Asia could be first observed in the immediate 
aftermath of the collapse of the Cold War’s balance of power. The new political 
circumstances of the international arena have caused among many nations a need to 
redefine their national identities. In the case of China and Japan, the construction of the 
new identity was correlated with the rising nationalistic interests manifested in the 
redefinition of historical memory. The past advocated through the narratives of historical 
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memory usually serves to legitimize the political power of the ruling elites. According to 
Wang (2012): “historical memory is not just a post hoc rationalization of behavior 
motivated by national interests but rather a direct source of policy behavior motivation.”  
Understanding the history of Yasukuni, or the role it has played in the history of 
Japan, is important for a better comprehension of the issues that the shrine raises in 
general. As mentioned previously, the ideological disputes in Sino-Japanese relations 
refer mainly to the approach towards history. At Yasukuni, the history emerges in several 
ways. The shrine’s history is closely related to the history of Japanese nationalism, the 
history of Japanese militarism, and the history of modern Japan in general. Even in the 
present day, the shrine is a powerful symbol used by the supporters of nationalistic 
movements. The previously mentioned Meiji Restoration was an enterprise of deep social 
and psychological change. It was arguably one of the most prominent examples of 
implementation of social engineering in practice. In order to support the initial political 
change of the passage from Tokugawa’s feudal regime into an Imperial nation-state, and 
legitimize the new power, Japan underwent a process of nation-building at every social 
level, including the religious sphere. In order to achieve the status of a modern nation, 
Japan, following the example of the Western nations, not only introduced national 
military service, a national education system, and political institutions copied from the 
Western powers, but also, unlike the West, reinvented the tradition of Shinto and 
proclaimed it to be the national religion of Japan. Thus, the establishment of Yasukuni 
was, crucial for the Meiji Government from a nation-building aspect. Moreover, as a 
memorial place, Yasukuni relates to history by commemorating those from the past. As a 
monument it is a historic symbol of the glorious past. And finally, because of the 
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presence of the archives and the Yushukan museum, it is a place that creates and 
propagates a certain kind of historical narrative. As Ann Sherif states: “Yasukuni 
represents Japan as the future warrior rather than a defeated nation honoring its past” 
(Sherif, 2007). Indeed, it is the shrine’s role in glorifying Japan’s war past, through the 
Yushukan “war museum,” and the secret enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in 
October 1978, that cause the biggest outrage among the opponents of the shrine (Meng, 
2014).  
Until the Meiji Restoration, although Shinto was present and observed since 
antiquity, it was Buddhism that predominantly occupied the religious landscape of Japan. 
In 1868 the Meiji government suspended official patronage of Buddhism and began the 
Great Promulgation Campaign, which was supposed to propagate the indigenous Japan-
specific religion – Shinto—as a national religion (Hardacre, 1989). The Great 
Promulgation Campaign reminds us of some of the concerns of the previous leadership in 
regard to the appearance of the Westerners. Part of the isolationist policy,!implemented 
during the Tokugawa era (1603-1868), was intended to prevent the Western 
dissemination of Christianity, which was seen, in current political terms, as a “soft 
power” tool used by the European imperialist powers to influence foreign cultures. When 
these powers could not efficiently penetrate the markets, they would send their 
missionaries to “penetrate people’s minds” and create more favorable conditions for the 
reception of the West. In a similar way, the Meiji Government wanted to use the potential 
of dissemination that a religion can offer by using Shinto as a medium of national 
indoctrination. In fact, the establishment of the Yasukuni shrine, soon after the change of 
leadership, was far from accidental. Under the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan was 
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organized according to “centralized feudalism,” with the capital at Edo. The Edo-based 
shogunate possessed hegemonic authority, but has not created a specific, unified identity 
for the whole country. In order to use the resources of the whole nation, in particular the 
ability to access the full militaristic potential in the form of its soldiers, the Meiji 
reformers had to find a factor that would bring people, who had been living for centuries 
in their own prefectures, together. A common national identity was a must for the 
successful development of the national conscription army, and thus the new mythologies 
were constructed. The mythical aspects of nationalism are essential for the creation of 
national identity, as they “cloak the differences” and “highlight the commonalities” 
within the nation, while differentiating the members of other nations (Guibernau, 1996, 
pp.80-82). The search for all “essentially Japanese,” meaning different and unique from 
other cultures, had begun, and where it could not be found, it was constructed anew or 
appropriated using old traditions and concepts. 
Shinto had been present in Japan since antiquity, which was used astutely by the 
Meiji Government. The legitimacy of the supreme leader of the new nation – the emperor 
– was constructed around the myth of his direct descent from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu 
– the mythological mother of Japan, one of the central figures in Shinto mythology.  
People had to believe in something that would justify, or even glorify, dying for non-
spiritual reasons like the new “imagined” nation of Japan. Elevating the Emperor to a 
status of demigod and establishing a shrine for those who would give up their lives in his 
name, and by extension in the name of Amaterasu, was one of the ways to achieve that 
instead. Since the kami of the fallen heroes were enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine, their 
social status was brought closer to Amaterasu and to the Emperor himself. The Emperor’s 
36 
!
respects paid at Yasukuni would further bring honor and recognition not only to the fallen 
soldiers, but also to their entire families; after all the descendent of the Goddess herself 
paid his respects to the dead. As John Breen (Breen, Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the 
Struggle for Japan's Past, 2008, p. 13) puts it: 
"Yasukuni was, from the moment of its creation, distinctive among these shrines 
either created anew or newly appropriated and transformed by the modern state. It 
was so in its relationship to the military, to the emperor himself and to society at 
large. Yasukuni, alone among modern Japan's shrines, was overseen jointly by the 
Army and Navy ministries, and they ensured that it never wanted for funding." 
The nature of Shintoism allowed it to coexist with other religious beliefs and to 
supplement the spiritual needs of the believers. Thus the Shinto represented in Yasukuni 
is part of the “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm) introduced in Japan only at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and the rites performed by the Shinto priests of Yasukuni do not 
derive from the ancient traditions only, but are modern appropriations of the older beliefs. 
The differences between Shintoism in its traditional form and Shinto State, as the 
construct of the Meiji Restoration, creates arguments against the visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, referring to the fact that the Prime Minister is not using his right to the freedom of 
religion, secured by article 20 of the Japanese Constitution, but rather paying respects to 
what Yasukuni Shrine stands for in ideological terms – Japan’s imperialistic past. 
Although paying respects at a national war memorial is a universally accepted norm, 
which involves the moral duty of the leadership to respect the memory of those who gave 
up their lives for the sake of their country – and the Shintoist rituals of apotheosis, 
veneration and propitiation are indeed part of Japanese cultural uniqueness – Yasukuni 
Shrine performs them selectively by observing only the spirits of the glorious soldiers, 
not the war dead. Souls of people who died as a result of the war, like victims of the 
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, for instance, are denied their space at Yasukuni. The 
two types of rites performed at Yasukuni are: the rite of apotheosis – elevation of the 
spirits to the status of kami; and the rite of propitiation – veneration and pacification of 
the enshrined kami (Breen, 2004). The first rite is continuing the tradition of the promise 
made to soldiers that their souls will be elevated to godly status. Kami, often translated as 
‘deity’ or ‘spirit’, are a form of spiritual beings nonexistent in other religions. They are a 
manifestation of the universe’s energy that is part of the nature and their worship is 
central to Shinto’s belief. Their character can be positive or negative, granting either 
blessings or cursing the humans. According to Shinto beliefs, souls of those who died too 
soon can seek vengeance and curse the people. The rite of propitiation is meant to pacify 
them and change their nature from evil spirits into benevolent ones.  John Breen explains 
the rite in following words: 
“Goryo cults involve the belief that the spirits of (usually) noble men and women 
who died inauspicious deaths are angry and resentful on account of their lives 
being cut prematurely short and, in their anger and resentment, return to curse the 
living and wreak havoc upon them. If, however, the living propitiate the angry 
spirits with the right offerings, then the angry spirits may be persuaded to desist 
from destruction and, indeed, to deploy their numinous powers to protect and 
bring solace to the living.” (Breen, Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the Struggle for 
Japan's Past, 2008, p. 146) 
 
The defenders of Yasukuni Shrine bring this tradition as an argument for the importance 
of paying respect to the kami of Yasukuni, so that the spirits will not haunt the people, 
but there is no explanation given to the possible haunting of the people by kami of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki victims. In an attempt to partially address this issue, the 
Chinreisha – “Spirit-Pacifying Shrine,” was built to pacify the souls of all the war dead 
around the world. Not only is it a smaller shrine, hidden in the corner of the complex, but 
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also throughout the history of its existence, it was fenced in order to stop its public 
observance. It is also not the subject of the main rituals performed at Yasukuni. 
 Another example of the meanings created by Yasukuni can be found in reference 
to cultural tokens. The cherry blossoms, mentioned previously, in Japanese culture and 
tradition stand for the soul of Japan. In a historical perspective, the Japanese have started 
to admire, praise, and associate the Japanese identity with the blossoms of these trees in 
response to the Chinese tradition of the similar cultural approach towards plum trees. The 
cherry blossom was therefore one of the older means to differentiate “us” – the cherry-
like Japanese, from “them” – the plum-like Chinese. By the time of the Meiji Restoration 
the cherry blossoms had become a trope in Japanese art and literature that would refer to 
the concept of mono no aware that can be understood as the acknowledgment of the 
ephemerality of life and nature. Indeed, since the cherry blossoms fall from the trees once 
they have achieved their final, most beautiful form, they were used as a metaphor of 
mortality and acceptance of human’s destiny. The appreciation of this concept led to the 
tradition of hanami or the observance of flowers that already in The Tale of Genji 
(arguably the first world’s novel, written in the eleventh century) refers to the observance 
of the cherry blossoms in particular. Up to the present day, the tradition is very popular 
among the Japanese population. The beautiful blossoms encourage people to gather under 
the trees and find time to enjoy the beauty of nature for as long as it lasts, while at the 
same time giving reasons to contemplate the ephemerality of one’s own existence. In 
fact, at Yasukuni the cherry trees were originally planted to console the souls of the fallen 
soldiers and for the joy of the visitors to the shrine. As the processes of Meiji 
militarization accelerated, the same cherry blossoms were used as a metaphor for young 
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soldiers who, like the falling cherry petals, in the prime of their lives, would face their 
demise. Additionally, Japan’s government would mark its presence in the newly acquired 
colonies by “beautifying” the landscape with the imported cherry trees. Emiko Ohnuky-
Tierney provides a full analysis of how this aesthetics was used by the militarist 
government to promote a militaristic agenda and the sacrifice made by the kamikaze 
pilots (Ohnuki-Tierney, 2010). The cherry blossoms are therefore not only the beautiful 
metaphor of “the Japanese soul,” but also a reminder of the deaths of young men, as well 
as Japan’s colonialism in Asia. 
 The up-to-date area of the Yasukuni as a collective symbol, manifested in the 
meanings presented above, allows for the reference towards shared ideological beliefs in 
the process of the argument-construction, which subsequently are found just or unjust 
depending on the ideological preferences of the audience. The next chapter will present 
some of the uses of these meanings in practice. 
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CHAPTER V 
YASUKUNI: CONNOTATIVE AREA 
Since axiological argumentation refers to matters of religion, ethics, and politics, 
among others, the collective symbol of Yasukuni Shrine can be easily used as an 
ideological object supporting the justifications of the arguments used in such a type of 
argumentation. The following chapter presents arguments in regard to the religious, 
political and ethical issues related to Yasukuni Shrine and its official observance by the 
Japanese Prime Minister.  
Yasukuni – religious aspects 
Seki Hei (Breen, Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the Struggle for Japan's Past, 
2008) uses the spiritual argument in argumentation based on the differences in Chinese 
and Japanese religiosity. The current leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 
4th and 5th generation in particular, were brought up in communist China, where atheism 
prevailed over religious beliefs of the past, and as a result explains their lack of 
understanding of religious importance. On the contrary, Japanese leaders see religious 
expression as an immanent part of their life, since Shinto was always present in Japan and 
thus is observed by the political elites in their private manner. In other words, Chinese 
critics of the Japanese PM’s religiously-grounded explanations in regard to paying 
respects to the souls of the fallen are unsound, as the concept of soul does not exist in the 
mind of Chinese leadership. This claim is supported with the example of Chairman 
Mao’s Memorial Hall in Beijing, where up to the present day the late chairman’s body is 
displayed, and it is “the materialistic” object of memory and political legitimization and 
not a “spiritual/esoteric” one (Hei, 2008). This kind of argumentation is an outstanding 
41 
!
example of the ideological nature of the dispute, as it relates to the axiological beliefs 
related to the afterlife on both sides of the dispute. To bring another example of the usage 
of Shinto’s meaning in the connotative area of the collective symbol, Nitta Hitoshi’s 
argument grounded in beliefs helps in providing an understanding. His argument relates 
to the fact that for the veterans, Yasukuni is the place of reunion with the comrades to 
whom they promised to “meet again at Yasukuni.” The families of the soldiers departing 
to war would also promise to visit them there at Yasukuni, should the soldiers not return 
home. According to Hitoshi: 
“If one makes a promise to the living, the arrangement can be changed as and 
when the circumstances require, but there can be no such revising of promises 
made with and received from the deceased. […] If the living were to change the 
arrangement to meet a new set of personal circumstances, it would be tantamount 
to a betrayal. If the living deceive the dead this way, consoling the spirit of the 
dead can have no meaning whatsoever” (Hitoshi, 2008). 
 
This statement hides two underlying premises concerning the spirits of the dead: first, 
that they exist; second, that their consolation has an important meaning, which is 
undeniably true for the Shinto practitioners, but it omits the fact that “the promise” itself 
was part of militaristic propaganda.   
Yasukuni – ethical aspects 
In legal terms Yasukuni brings further disputes related to the understanding of the 
Japanese Constitution. According to the rulings of the Fukuoka Court and Osaka Court, 
the Prime Minister’s official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine breach the Constitutional 
provisions of separation of state and religion. On the other hand, the same article assures 
freedom of religion, in which case the PM as a private subject has all the rights to execute 
his freedom. The article 20 of the Constitution of Japan reads, as follows: 
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1. Freedom of Religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall 
receive any privileges from the state, nor exercise any political authority.  
2. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, 
right or practice.  
 
3. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other 
religious activity.12 
 
The Prime Minister, as a public servant of a very high rank, should undisputedly follow 
the Constitution as he is representing the government that uses it to sustain itself, but this 
creates a paradox in which by observing the provisions of the constitution he either 
breaks its laws, or denies himself the rights provided by it. That paradox would be true if 
not for the Article 89 of the constitution, which states: 
“No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, 
benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any 
charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public 
authority.”13 
 
The Prime Minister’s visits to the Shrine in a private capacity, meaning without public 
announcements of the visit, with no use of public money for the offerings and no use of 
the government’s vehicles or the official title, would not cause any problems. But there is 
a “catch 22” observed by the opponents of the visits. The Prime Minister, by being a 
public official of high rank, is being protected by the secret service funded from public 
money, and thus his visits to the Shrine involve public funding.  
There is another legal dimension pointed out by Takehashi Tetsuya (2003), 
known for his critique of nationalist right-wing policies. He fiercely addresses the issue 
related to the enshrinement of the Class-A War Criminals, which points not only towards 
the denial of Japan’s responsibility for its colonial past, but also to the current 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The Constitution of Japan, Article 20 (1947). 
 
13 The Constitution of Japan, Article 89 (1947).!
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government’s political agenda. He criticizes the reduction of the problem of the PM’s 
visits to just the observance of enshrined Class-A war criminals. Such presentation of the 
issue overshadows many other controversial deeds of the other war dead enshrined at 
Yasukuni. The de-enshrinement of Class-A War Criminals would not solve the problem, 
but only bury the real issue – support of militarism. The new national site of mourning as 
the solution would also not solve the problem. The voices advocating for this solution 
sound like an expectation of a new generation of “fallen soldiers.” The PM’s visits to 
Yasukuni and the attempts to reestablish national patrimony of the shrine are intended to 
re-accustom the Japanese population to the military narrative and to help the political 
elites to argue in favor of the abolishment of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 
known as “the peace clause,” which prohibits Japan from having a regular army.  
The PM’s visits are also referred to from a more ethical perspective relating to the 
imperial connections to the shrine. Since Emperor Hirohito was granted immunity during 
the Tokyo Trials, and was thus not held responsible for the war atrocities despite being 
the chief commander and the leader of the nation at the time, why should his people feel 
any guilt? The same emperor was the head of the country before the war and after, so the 
sacrifices made in the war did not serve only the militaristic government, but also the 
future Japan. As John Dower observes: “Emperor Hirohito became postwar Japan’s 
preeminent symbol, and facilitator, of non-responsibility and non-accountability” 
(Dower, 2012). 
Yasukuni – political aspects 
 Finally, Yasukuni is used in political terms both at the domestic and international 
level. For Japanese politicians, Yasukuni visits are important in order to win the 
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nationalistic part of the electorate. According to Mainichi Daily News poll from 2006, 
50% of Japanese supported PM Koizumi’s visit to the shrine14 (Rose, 2008). The younger 
generations of nationalists are tired of the apologetic tone of Japanese diplomacy and 
demand a more assertive approach. Criticism of the country is seen as “unpatriotic,” 
which is fueled by official statements of politicians, academics, and ultra-conservative 
rightwing supporters. The Chinese and Korean reactions to the PM’s visits are presented 
as interference into Japan’s internal affairs on behalf of the generally skeptical neighbors, 
who through their rhetorical machinations are trying to demote Japan from its place as a 
global leader. Yasukuni can further be seen as a tool of interference into the domestic 
policy of China. Since the anti-Japanese sentiments in China are strong, the Japanese 
PM’s visits to Yasukuni will have to meet with a reaction on behalf of the Chinese 
government. That precise reaction can possibly turn into anti-Japanese protests, which, 
with enough friction, can morph into protests against the government in general. The lack 
of any reaction can trigger protests of dissatisfaction with the leadership’s weakness, 
which the CCP tries to avoid at all costs. Thus the political gains in the international 
arena can be observed on both sides. What is important to remember, though, is that for 
as much as many countries fear the Chinese increasing in strength, its weakness is also a 
cause of fear. In a paradoxical way, in order to sustain the current international system, 
China cannot fail, but at the same time, the more its power grows, the more security 
dilemmas arise. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 ‘50% of Japanese support Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni shrine, 17 August 2006. 
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Yasukuni – conclusion 
 For Japan, Yasukuni is a memory of the past: the glorious past and the fearful 
past.  Disregarding it completely would make the deaths of all those who died for the 
greatness of the nation to have fought in vain. But at the same time it calls to mind all the 
futile deaths that the war has brought. The ideology propagated through Yasukuni at the 
time of its establishment was an important factor in the nation-building enterprise and 
helped to create the unifying spirit of national identity. It is part of the foundation of the 
Japanese nation, the same way Mao Zedong is the father of PRC, despite the fact that 
China suffered because of the Cultural Revolution that was launched because of him. 
Even if Mao has been critiqued by the following generations, saying that he was entirely 
wrong would discredit the trustworthiness of the political system founded by him. The 
problem then lies in the fact that not everything about Yasukuni can be discarded, but 
many of its aspects would benefit from a redefinition in the spirit that acknowledges the 
perpetrated atrocities that have happened due to the Japanese struggle for the recognition 
as a powerful modern state. For other Asian nations, Yasukuni is precisely the reminder 
of the lack of full responsibility for what happened. It is the reminder of all the war-
related atrocities. Referring to John Breen’s words once more: “It was the Japan of the 
Meiji constitution, over which the emperor, descended from the Sun goddess, ruled as 
‘sacred and inviolable’; it was the Japan in which the Imperial Army enjoyed 
extraordinary constitutional privileges; the Japan in which the Imperial rescript on 
education and its Confucian ethical imperatives were accorded sacred status. This was 
not the democratic Japan of individual freedoms and rights” (Breen, 2008). 
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CHAPTER VI 
CASE STUDY: ARTICLE ANALYSIS 
The final chapter of this thesis is intended to present how the axiological basis of 
the discourse around Yasukuni is used in practice. The following analysis will present the 
reduction of Yasukuni’s parameters by the Chinese Government in order to use it as an 
ideological object in its own nationalistic discourse. For the purpose of this paper, 101 
articles were retrieved from the website of the online version of the Chinese newspaper – 
People's Daily.15 People's Daily is a state-run newspaper with an estimated circulation of 
3 to 4 million readers. As much as the objectivity of the published articles is being 
criticized due to the close relation of the newspaper with the Communist Party, People's 
Daily is an excellent medium for the analysis of the Party's policies and viewpoints. The 
image of Abe Shinzō, as well as opinions on his visits to Yasukuni shrine, can be 
therefore treated as the extension of the government's standpoint and provide the 
information on the rhetoric used by the CCP to influence the domestic public opinion. 
Moreover, the arguments and the connotations in which the image is presented will serve 
to portray the use of Yasukuni as a collective symbol in the ideological attribution of 
anti-Japanese nationalistic discourse. 
Although the online version of the newspaper can be accessed in different foreign 
languages, the ties with the Party pose problems in analysis of the content. One of the 
main obstacles can be found in the meanings “lost in translation”. The foreign versions of 
the articles tend to have a less aggressive tone, and the content of the articles focuses 
more on Chinese foreign policies, thus transforming the newspaper into a direct tool of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/191606/372930/ accessed on June 12th 2014. 
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"soft power" propaganda, rather than a medium for report of an objective truth. Taking 
this into consideration, all the data collected for the purposes of this thesis was retrieved 
in Chinese. For this reason, the analysis presented here is just an attempt to recreate the 
image of Abe Shinzō as disseminated by the Chinese Government through the public 
press, in order to point toward further research. The author is fully aware that for a more 
conclusive interpretation of the presented data, there is a need for revision of it by an 
expert with higher proficiency in the Chinese language. Similarly, in order to recreate the 
entire image of Abe Shinzō in the Chinese press, there is a need for further research on a 
bigger variety of sources. 
All the articles used in the analysis were posted from January 2nd to February 
26th 2014. The collected data forms a representative corpus of text composed of 106,827 
Chinese characters. Since the majority of Chinese characters are morphemes and there is 
no need for space to separate words, the characters were first separated into larger 
meaningful units that would facilitate analysis (words, idioms, metaphoric expressions, 
etc.) and later checked for any possible errors. This process provided 56,244 separate 
words in total, among which 6,611 words were of distinct, separate meaning. Due to the 
isolating nature of the Chinese language the process of lemmatization was not required; 
regardless of their grammatical or syntactical functions the Chinese words do not change 
their orthographic form. The final data retrieved in this way was subsequently analyzed 
quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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Quantitative analysis 
For the purpose of the quantitative analysis, words of semantically similar 
meanings were categorized into larger groups. Uncategorized words irrelevant for the 
purposes of this research (among which were for example the words with only 
grammatical function, such as particles) were discarded. This process was an attempt to 
establish semantic categories in order to present the most objective reflection of the 
reality created through linguistic construction. The categories retrieved in this way will 
serve as the basis for the analysis of the image of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō created in 
People's Daily. Since most of the meaningful units in Chinese are two-character 
compounds, and the idiomatic expressions usually are formed by four-character 
compounds, the collocations given to the analyzed words were retrieved from a range of 
six characters to the left of the given word, and six to the right. In this manner the 
analysis would observe the meaningful units with their grammatical variations. The 
column Word% represents the percentage of the total number of occurrences in respect to 
the final number of words in the whole corpus of data. Table 1 shows the results of the 
categorization process.  
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Table 1. 
Categories 
Number of 
Occurrences Word% 
Japan 1510 2.68% 
Yasukuni 1314 2.34% 
Abe Shinzō  1212 2.15% 
War 1170 2.08% 
International Relations 1113 1.98% 
Criticism 864 1.54% 
Militarism 638 1.13% 
China 567 1.01% 
Crimes 471 0.84% 
Peace 417 0.74% 
USA 398 0.71% 
History 345 0.61% 
Harm 279 0.50% 
Korea 227 0.40% 
Fascism 105 0.19% 
Germany 99 0.18% 
   
 
a. Japan, Yasukuni, and Abe Shinzō 
Considering the topics of the articles it is not surprising that the three top 
categories regard "Japan", "Yasukuni" and "Abe Shinzō." The word "Japan," in any of its 
possible syntactical positions, has occurred 1,510 times and is a category of its own. The 
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category "Yasukuni" is composed of two groups: the direct references to the shrine, and 
words that could be separately categorized as "worship." For instance, the wordD
(cānbài) – meaning “to formally call on/to worship/to pay homage” appeared 517 times, 
and f(gòngfèng) – “to enshrine and worship/an offering/a sacrifice”— 82 times. Both 
of the terms were used in close collocation with prime minister's name, primarily as a 
description of the action he undertook when visiting the the Yasukuni shrine. In the 
category "Abe Shinzō," beside the direct usage of the proper name, additional referential 
words were included, for example ĳö(shǒuxiàng) - "prime minister" (249) and W
(lǐngdǎo rén) - "leader" (101). 
b. War, militarism, and crime 
Of particular interest were all references to war and army, divided into the 
categories of "War," "Militarism," and "Crimes." The three categories have obvious 
collocations with the topics of the articles, since Yasukuni is the shrine devoted to the 
souls of the war dead, and the 14 Class A war criminals are enshrined there. Additionally, 
it is being treated as the symbol of the militarist past of Japan. These three categories are 
the core of the controversies aroused by the prime minister's visits.  
Most of the words constituting the category "War" had one character in common 
– (zhàn) which on its own means “war/fight/battle/to fight.” The word 
(zhànzhēng) "war" occurred 222 times. The second biggest semantic collocation included 
in this category was !ñ (qīnlüè), which means "invasion" and occurred 199 times. The 
two words combined together form a compound noun !ñ (qīnlüè zhànzhēng) or 
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"the invasive war," that occurred 84 times separately from the previous instances. 
Historical events, such as World War II (222), the invasion of China (65), the First and 
Second Sino-Japanese Wars (12), the Pacific War (14), and the Russo-Japanese War (5), 
were also included in this category. Under the category "Militarism" the most common 
character was  (jūn) "army/military/arms" and the top occurrence was \
(jūnguó zhǔyì) or "militarism" (235). The reference to the Ú (jūnshì fǎtíng) "the 
military tribunals" appeared 37 times. Finally, the category "Crimes" has enclosed all the 
references to the Class-A War Criminals enshrined in Yasukuni. The most commonly 
used word to refer to the war criminals was è (zhànfàn) "war criminal" (176), that 
was preceded by ï. (jiǎjí) "first grade" in 122 cases. Ċę (zuìxíng) "crime/offense" 
(39) was most commonly collocated with the word (zhànzhēng), which formed 
another way of expressing "war crimes." The Adu% (NánjīngDàtúshā) "the 
Nanjing massacre," and the 8 (Dōngjīngshěnpàn) or "the Tokyo Trial," were also 
included in this category and they were mentioned 36 and 17 times respectively.  
c. International relations, USA, Korea, China, and Germany 
Another very relevant semantic category was constituted of words categorized 
under "International relations." The word \T (Guójì) "international" appeared on its 
own 286 times, and in 128 cases was followed by û (shèhuì) "society." The most 
common collocates of "international" were R (zhàn hòu) "post-war" andÿ} (zhìxù) 
"social order" creating together the compound noun "post-war international order" (57). 
Another collocation was ¢ (tiǎozhàn) meaning "challenge" (46). The category 
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"International relations" also included the 242 reference to diplomacy (ambassador - 133, 
diplomacy - 68, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – 35, embassy – 21, etc.), as well asP\
(línguó) "neighboring countries" (108), and 
¶(zhōngrì) "Sino-Japanese" (111). The 
latter was most commonly collocated with ,Ĉ (guānxì) – "relations." The 23 references 
to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes were also included in this category.  
The USA, Korea, China, and Germany, were separated from the category 
"International relations" since the occurrences of this words and their collocations was 
found relevant for separate analysis. The word ċ\ (měiguó) " the United States" 
appeared in the corpus on its own 307 times, and it was collocated with the words e¿
(shīwàng) - "disappointed/to lose hope" (27), (zhèngfǔ) - "government" (32), and \
į(guówùyuàn) - "State Department" (14). ċ¶,Ĉ(měi rì guānxì) - "American-
Japanese relations" were evoked 14 times. The 227 occurrences of the word "Korea" 
were most closely collocated with the word "China;" most of the times the two countries 
were mentioned both as opposing Abe's visit to Yasukuni, as well as victims of Japan's 
militarist past. The word "China" appeared most often, with the collocation of Õ 
(rénmín) - "people" (96), and d (dàshǐ) - "ambassador" (70), pointing towards the two 
main subjects of the critique towards Abe Shinzō . \ (déguó) - "Germany" was most 
closely collocated with ¶Á(rìběn) - "Japan" (30), and 
 (lìshǐ) - "history" (22), both 
in meaning of shared history under the Axis alliance, as well as in the arguments about 
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the different way in which the two countries dealt with their war-related past. Germany 
was used as an example for Japan to follow in the future.16 
d. History 
The word "history" that appeared 345 times was collocated with RX(wèntí) – 
"problem" (50)F÷(fǎnxǐng) – "to reflect upon oneself" (46)!ñ(qīnlüè) – 
"invasion" (97) \(jūnguó zhǔyì) – "militarism" 38andČÉ (fān'àn) – "to 
present different views on a historical person or verdict" (29). These collocations indicate 
clearly the Chinese viewpoint on Japanese approach to history, and the rhetoric of its 
critique.  
e. Harm 
The two characters that have appeared most often in the compound words 
categorized as "harm" were 
(shāng) "to injure/wound" (65), andq(hài) 
"harm/evil/calamity" (130). In 28 cases they appeared together forming the compound 

q (shānghài) "to injure/to harm". The words composed of 
(shāng) were most closely 
collocated with (zhōngguó rénmín) – "Chinese population" (28) and 
(gǎnqíng) – "feeling/emotion" (12). Words containing q(hài), on the other hand, 
appeared most often in close presence to Õ(rénmín) – "population" (59)G(shòu) – 
"to receive/to suffer" (45)ĭ (yánzhòng) – "grave/serious/critical" (29), and W{
(hépíng) – "peace" (22). Besides all of the words containing either 
or qthe other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 More details in the analysis of the category "fascism" 
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words that have been included in this category included ãV(zāinàn) – "calamity" (30), 
O´(yízú) – "the bereaved" (27), and the reference to n(wèi'ān fù) – "the comfort 
women" (13). 
f. Peace  
The word W{(hépíng) – "peace" has appeared in all the articles 251 times. It was 
most often collocated with the wordsð(shìjiè) – "world" (70), 8#(wéihù) – "to 
protect/defend/uphold" (43), and,o (wěndìng) – "stability/to stabilize/to pacify" (37). 
The category "Peace" also included all the occurrences of the word O (hézuò) – "to 
cooperate" and z¿ (xīwàng) – "to hope" (50), expressing the hope for Japan to «Z
(gǎishàn) – "to improve" (29) relations with the neighboring countries, and the view of its 
own history. 
g. Fascism 
The category "Fascism" included all occurrences of the words zç>(xītèlēi) – 
"Hitler," ÚĜ± (fàxīsī) – "Fascist," and /Ć(nàcuì) – "Nazi." The in-depth analysis of 
this category will be covered in the following section of qualitative analysis.  
Qualitative analysis 
The corpus of the collected data could be analyzed in detail in many aspects, but 
the qualitative analysis of the articles is concentrated mainly on one aspect. The category 
"Fascism" discovered during the quantitative analysis of the data appeared to be 
particularly interesting, and therefore the qualitative analysis will consist of closer 
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readings of the articles containing straight reference to this category. The so-called 
argumentum ad hitlerum is a well-known ad hominem and ad misericordiam fallacy, or a 
fallacy of irrelevance, which derives its rhetorical power from the mechanism of guilt by 
association. The use of this particular scheme in the case of the presented articles is not 
entirely fallacious, as one can find associations between Japanese militarist government 
of the WWII era and Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, in many cases, the comparison of Abe 
Shinzo to Hitler is fallaciously aimed to divert the attention from the main argument of 
the dispute towards the provocative associations that they engender.  
h. "Fascism" 
As we already saw in the quantitative analysis, the category "Fascism" was not the 
most popular in the corpus, yet in the author’s opinion, it was the most interesting. After 
all, the semantics of this category are rhetorically extremely powerful and provocative, 
and they evoke one of the most shameful and horrifying facts, feelings, and memories of 
the history of humanity.  
Altogether, out of the 101 articles the words from the category "Fascism" were 
used in the titles or leads of 11 of them (4 used ÚĜ± (fàxīsī) - "fascism," three used z
ç>(xītèlēi) - "Hitler," and 6 used /Ć(nàcuì) - "Nazi").17 Out of 51 uses of the word 
"fascism" in the whole corpus of data, it was used 26 times with the preceding particle 	
(fan) "oppose/ anti-." The following is an example of such usage with the collocation of 
the word "fascism" and "Abe Shinzō:" 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 In case of two articles more than one word of the category was used at the same time, therefore the final 
number of usages does not correspond to the number of articles. 
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n % D İ\ üû , ¸  ð FÚĜ±    Ç W R \T ÿ} ò 
¢ 18 
Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine is a challenge to the outcome of the world's Anti-
Fascist war and the post-war international order.19  
The word "Nazi" was used 35 times, and Hitler's name appeared 20 times. Out of the 11 
articles, 5 of them were the translated statements of the Chinese Ambassadors to France, 
Mauritius, Great Britain, Italy, and the European Union; one was a biographic portrayal 
of all of the 14 Class-A war criminals; and the rest were general articles on Abe Shinzō 's 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The article on the Class-A war criminals will not be 
analyzed in detail, since it is a historical portrayal. I will present briefly the main 
arguments against Abe Shinzō and the worship of Yasukuni stated in the other articles in 
the following section. 
i. The Ambassador's reactions 
In the corpus data 38 articles in total consisted of the reprinted commentaries of 
Chinese diplomatic envoys to foreign countries from all around the globe, including the 
Chinese official diplomatic representation to the EU and the UN. The previously 
mentioned international dimension of Yasukuni can be observed easily through the 
arguments and, most importantly, media in which they were reprinted abroad that were 
presented by People’s Daily. Chinese outcry against Abe Shinzo’s visit to the shrine has 
been presented in a global dimension. Out of all of the reactions, five of them directly 
used reference to fascism.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18"
\Ìó¤GÌj¥n%Dİ\üû" 
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0125/c1002-24225528.html accessed on 06.12.2014. 
19 All the translations in this section were performed by the author.!!
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France 
"
\YÚ\dÚj5¯:n%ĵiP¾]zç>_<éĕ"20 (Chinese 
Ambassador to France in an article published in French Media: Abe's Ghost Worshiping 
is Comparable to Someone's Offerings of Flowers at Hitler’s grave) summarizes the 
arguments presented by the Chinese Ambassador to France, published in French 
newspaper "Le Figaro" on the 16th of January 2014 under the title "Why the Visit of the 
Japanese Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine is a Shock for China?". Ambassador 
Zhai Jun, apart from comparing Yasukuni shrine to Hitler's grave, condemns the 
Yushukan Museum by giving the following arguments: 
- It blames the outbreak of the Pacific War on the United States' and Britain's 
"provocation" and "oppression"; the purpose of war was "to get rid of white 
colonial rule in Asia." 
- It denies the Nanjing Massacre. The museum does not mention the fact that 
the Japanese massacred more than 300,000 Chinese civilians and prisoners of 
war.  
- It treats the construction of the so called "Death Railway" as an engineering 
marvel, not mentioning that the railway was built at the expense of the lives of 
13,000 Allied prisoners of war, and 90,000 workers from Southeast Asia.  
- It completely negates the Tokyo Trials, saying that they were unilateral trials 
created by the victors according to their own laws against the vanquished. 21 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 "
\Ú\dÚj5¯:n%ĵiP¾]zç>_<éĕ" 
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0116/c1002-24142189.html accessed on 06.12.2014 
21 Ibid. 
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The comparison of Yasukuni to Hitler’s grave overlooks Yasukuni’s role as a war 
memorial and redirects the reader’s attention directly to the connotations related to the 
Class-A War Criminals enshrined at the shrine. The Ambassador concludes the article 
relating to a recent trial of a German war criminal. While praising Germany for the on-
going fight against the war criminals, he poses a key rhetorical question:  
">c
\RĶ¶ÁĒ(\'LRX" 
Many Chinese people will ask, why cannot Japan treat historical issues as 
Germany did? 
In this manner, the Ambassador astutely links Yasukuni Shrine visits to the parallel 
disputes in regard to Japanese history textbooks. 22 
Mauritius 
In "
\YÔĬÖ±dÃĂn%:L&K×¾<ħ"23 (Chinese 
Ambassador to Mauritius Li La Criticizes Abe: Turning Back the Clock Has No Future), 
the Ambassador Li La states that Abe's visit to Yasukuni shrine openly challenges the 
Tokyo Trials, as well as the international peace and order. He refers to the 70 years of 
fight against fascism, and then evokes all the atrocities committed by Japan under the 
fascist rule: 
"¶Á!ñĐu%
\Õ强£wĤJ§ÑgNęÝZ
1ė W?k ;ĨAdu%ĄĈ6*5òÉĶď.
E
Ù)N\Õ[Ę" 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22!Controversies in regard to the revision of history textbooks and the changes to the Fundamental Law of 
Education. For detailed description of the controversy see Rose 1998, 2004.!
23
\ ÔĬÖ±dÃĂn%: L& ×¾<ħ
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0113/c1002424104743.html!accessed!on!June!12th!2014.!
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Japanese invaders massacred Chinese civilians indiscriminately, forced labor 
upon them, violated and ravaged women, led in-vivo experiments and bio-
chemical warfare trials, and made a series of inhuman/cannibalistic tragedies 
happen, such as the Nanjing Massacre, which stained with blood the hands of 
people of all the countries. 
The particularly evocative metaphor of the “hands of people of all the countries” is 
intended to portray Japan as not only harmful to China, but also to the whole world. 
Furthermore, the Ambassador evokes all of the war crimes committed by Japan, thus 
extrapolating the meaning of Abe’s visit to Yasukuni to appraisal of all of the mentioned 
atrocities. The Ambassador finishes his article with a figurative rhetorical question 
further supporting this point 
"n% DM'	^²ĶVĪÊ
::|GqĎÞáò[Ę
ķ" 
Abe insists on visiting this kind of a place, is he not afraid to see the blood-
dripping victims in his dreams? 
Great Britain 
In "7$·d¤GĖjõ¨@ n%D“¶Á/Ć”24 (The Ambassador Liu 
Xiaoming Accepted Live Interview with the British Media and Criticized Abe's Homage 
to "Japanese Nazi") the Chinese Ambassador to England openly condemns Abe Shinzō 's 
visit to the Yasukuni shrine. He says: 
"¸Ķ¶ÁĳöäD f¾ï. èòİ\üûĶï. èt¸¶
Áò/ĆBiÇ\WDzç>./Ć èĶĖ\Õs
ķsÓĶtĒ»h^êĞ
\ÕòG" 
The truth is that Japanese Prime Minister flagrantly visited the Yasukuni shrine to 
worship the Class-A War Criminals, the Class-A War Criminals are precisely the 
Japanese Nazis. Imagine if a German leader would pay homage to Hitler or other 
Nazi war criminals, how would the British people feel? Only when you put 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
247·d¤GĖjõ¨ n%D“¶ÁĆ http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0115/c1002-
24128547.html accessed on June 12th 2014. 
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yourself into somebody else's shoes, you can understand better the feelings of 
Chinese people.  
As it is noticed, the above statement from the interview with Ambassador Liu was 
replayed in the prime time evening news programs.25  
Italy 
In "
\Yd9dÃëm:¶Á\Tûò,à"26 (Chinese 
Ambassador to Italy Li Ruiyu: Japan Became the Source of Concern for Instability to the 
International Community), a reprint of the article published in Italian Corriere della Sera 
under the title "Never Allow Japan to Turn Back the Clock," Li Ruiyi praises German 
chancellor Willy Brandt’s public apologies in front of the Warsaw's monument for the 
victims of the ghetto uprising that occurred in December 1970. He argues that the 
Japanese Prime Minister should learn from former German chancellor's actions. When 
referring to Abe Shinzō 's visit to Yasukuni he says: 
"İ\üû¸ ÀS¶Á\b!ñ ³ÒÕ6Øòć
üw/Wġ" 
The Yasukuni shrine is the tool and symbol of launching of the war of aggression 
by the Japanese militarist and implementation of the spirit of the colonial rule 
during the World War II. 
He adds further: 
"	LĉF÷ò\r¸BUòn%«ĲĮ­ąĶ`=ª
ĶìĔ"ğ$«W{ÚMĈ6ğ?WĶÍ]¶ÁS@3BU
òÐħn%y3ĢÜP\W\TûòĴ~Ġ" 
When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine for the 
war of aggression he fully exposed his right-wing nature. This indicates that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25!Ibid.!
26
\ d9dÃëm:¶Á\ û ò à
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0113/c1002424105160.html!accessed!on!June!12th!2014.!
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today, nearly 70 years after the end of World War II, the Japanese still cannot 
understand and treat its history of aggression correctly. The visit’s purpose is an 
attempt to subvert the post-war international social justice trial of Japanese 
militarism, as well as challenge the results of World War II and the postwar 
international order. !
European Union 
In 
\YÌóQ©¯A¶ÁĒÍ;WF÷L27(The Article of the 
Head of Chinese Diplomatic Mission to the EU Criticizes Japan For Not Being Able to 
Face and Reflect Its Own History) once again Germany's way of dealing with its Nazi 
past is evoked as an example for Japan to follow. Additional comments on Abe's politics 
are expressed as follows: 
"¯ă¡2ĶC| 12½ 26¶Ķ¶Áĳön%¹äDİ\üûĶ0Ë
ĢÜ\rW\Tûòĭ,4\T9?ºĩÛ:ĶK|ÅĶ
n%=强\rn*Â;Ķ¶ÁĮ­ą2ĭĝF®Ķ`=ªĶ¬
Æ]Ï[2H²ıòē-ÄĶìĔ+pĀĶ(í°òô&]$«
W{Ú" 
As the article pointed out, the outrageous visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzō to the Yasukuni Shrine on the 26th of December of the last year, yet again 
caused serious concerns of the Asian countries and the international community. 
The international public opinion has been alarmed, from the year that Abe has 
come to power, he has strengthened the national security, made important 
adjustments to the Japanese defense policy, increased military spending, loosened 
the self-restrains in the export of weapons, and even publicly declared that he 
struggled all his life in order to revise the peace clause of the constitution. 
In this case the EU Ambassador attacks the previously mentioned legal issue surrounding 
Yasukuni Shrine. The final unjustness of Abe’s visits to Yasukuni is found in his 
attempts to remilitarize Japan and change the peace clause of the Japanese Constitution 
that is prohibiting the country from engaging in military actions other than self-defense.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27
\Ìó©¯¶ÁĒÍ
WF÷L
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0103/c1002-24014234.html accessed on June 12th 2014. 
62 
!
Ambassador’s reactions – summary 
 The Ambassador’s reactions to Japanese Prime Minister’s visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine address mainly the international and legal dimensions of the Yasukuni dispute. 
They differ from the previously exemplified ones in as much as the reduction of 
Yasukuni’s parameters is aimed for political gains of China in international aren. The 
Chinese rhetoric is very congruent as we can see for a comparison in President Xi 
Jinping’s speech quoted in the introduction. The reduction of the shrine’s parameters and 
presentation of the topic in close relation to other controversial issues is meant to 
mutually reinforce the unjustness of the PM’s visit as advocated by the Chinese side. In 
fact, the religious aspects are not tackled by the Chinese side as much as in the case of the 
Japanese opponents of the visits. The comparison of Yasukuni Shrine to Hitler’s grave is 
evoking similarities of the atrocities committed by Japan and Germany, but it overlooks 
the fact that the PM, at least officially, is not visiting the shrine to pay his respects to the 
Class-A War Criminals in particular, but rather to commemorate the war dead in general. 
The articles presented below, on the other hand, attack precisely this issue in a rhetorical 
manner. 
j. The remaining articles 
In "n%ĥòzç> DNA"28 (Abe’s Hitler's DNA) posted on January 18th 
2014, the author of the article compares the current political and economic situation in 
Japan to the one that Hitler's Germany was facing after WWI. Abe's redefinition of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28n%ĥòzç> DNAhttp://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0118/c1002-24157431.html accessed on 
06.12.2014. 
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"aggression", revision of the history textbooks, and proposed changes to the constitution 
regarding the pacifism clause are compared to the actions that Hitler undertook to 
overthrow the Weimar Pact. The article is concluded with the following words: 
"n%C| 9½]ċ\0-òâ=
DLĶ“iÇdrĀ‘Mč
\Ď’òCĶītE"T”n%ĶiÇ«Ā“zç>”U" 
Last September in his speech given in New York Abe Shinzō said the following 
words: "If you want to call me a right-wing militarist, then go ahead". Abe, what 
if we called you "Hitler"? 
This rhetorical question is an outstanding example of the ad hitlerum fallacy, which in 
relation to the support of militarism, transposes associations related to Hitler to the 
current Japanese PM.  
Similarly, in O´îæ³¶Á­ĝD29 (The Association of the 
Bereaved Families Used Sorrowful Signboards to Put Pressure on Japanese Politicians 
Paying the Visits) the strongest argument is made by exposing more the intimate 
connection of Abe Shinzō to the venerated Class-A War Criminals. 
"VùĶn%¸¶Á ï. èv#òb" 
As we all know, Abe is a grandson of Japanese World War II Class A war 
criminal – Kishi Nobusuke. 
Abe Shinzō 's visit to Yasukuni Shrine is then once again juxtaposed with Willy Brandt's 
apologies in front of the monument for the victims of Warsaw's ghetto uprising. The 
argument that the prime minister should pay his respects to the victims, rather than the 
oppressors, is put forward once again. Additionally, the author points out the rightists 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29´îæ³¶Á­ĝD http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0102/c1002-24001874.html 
accessed on June 12th 2014.!
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support of Abe Shinzō in Japan, and quotes the words of Asahi Brewery honorary 
advisor: 
"Dİ\üûò­ØrĶ×¾­òIÈ" 
The politicians that do not visit Yasukuni shrine, are not eligible for holding the 
power. 
This maneuver is aimed to warn the audience of the overall right wing tendency in 
Japanese domestic policy to support militarism, and thus to present the “fascist” 
inclinations of the ruling political elites. 
In =djGH¶Áĳön%Dİ\üû30(Canadian Media Condemn 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe for Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine) the current 
chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Dachau concentration camp is mentioned. The main 
argument lays in the fact that her visit to Dachau or any other war memorial was not with 
the purpose to commemorate the Nazi soldiers, but for the memory of the victims. Abe 
Shinzō 's visit is commented as follows: 
"Î[·åò¸Ķ2013| 12½ 26¶Ķ¶Áĳön%Dİ\ü
ûİ\üû fø ÀSò 14Qï. èWÙ)µĦ{Õ[Ę
ò¶Áa-" 
In sharp contrast [to chancellor's Merkel visit to Dachau], on December 26th , 
2013, the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō visited the Yasukuni Shrine. The 
Yasukuni Shrine venerates the World War II 14 famous Class-A war criminals 
and worships the hands of Japanese soldiers stained with the blood of innocent 
civilians. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30=dj¶Áĳön%Dİ\üû http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0208/c1002-
24299630.html accessed on June 12th 2014. 
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Thus we can observe the Chinese criticism towards “the war memorial” aspects of 
Yasukuni Shrine, which is not intended to commemorate the victims, but rather the 
victimizers.  
Finally, <7İ0ð) 31 (Do Not Allow for the Appeasement That 
Will Drag the World into War Again) presents a wide range of criticism of Abe's 
domestic and foreign policy, especially the individual or party interests which are put 
above the interests of the nation. The changes to the constitution proposed by Abe are 
compared to the changes to the constitution in Nazi Germany. Finally, words of 
disappointment and critique were addressed towards the United States. The United 
States’ official reaction to Abe's visit was "disappointing", which in the Chinese view is a 
bit too selfish and veiled. The United States should not support Japan in order to counter 
China, as they will suffer once more. 
“]n%Dİ\üûRĶċ\		ěú‘e¿’ĶlJ'»cĶ
Yòģ.d\Ķċ\Ē1xýĶI
\¦{ĚĶďđRª ¶Á
ċ\Mþ'Úò¼24ÇĶIēx»dā~G:¶Áò+;WXĶ
¼20ËßG.q” 
After Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, the United States merely expressed 
'disappointment', but the US can do more, as the only superpower, the United 
States cannot rely on selfishness, only to seek a balance against China, and in 
result support Japan. The final outcome of such approach by the United States will 
only make them subject to a greater extent of containment and bigger influence 
from Japan. Eventually the United States will suffer from Japan once more.  
 To summarize, the way that the Japanese Prime Minister is reported in the 
Chinese media in regard to Yasukuni “feeds into patriotic education campaigns and 
reinforces what the younger generation of Chinese has been taught in school” (Rose, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31	İ0ð) http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0118/c1002-24157428.html accessed on 
June 12th 2014. 
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2008). The previously mentioned assertiveness in diplomatic claims can be observed in 
criticism of the USA’s reactions to Yasukuni shrine visits. Although, Japan and the 
United States are official allies, and therefore they are more keen to support each other in 
diplomatic issues, Chinese rhetoric is critical to the lack of diplomatic intervention. Once 
again, despite the militaristic interests of the US in form of alliance with Japan, in order 
to maintain profitable relations with China, the US government has to acknowledge the 
ideological disputes and maneuver diplomatically between the Chinese and Japanese 
nationalistic sentiments.  
 In conclusion, closer analysis of the article’s related to Abe Shinzo’s visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine, show how China uses the reduction of ideological parameters to only 
those related to the militaristic and shameful past of Japan. At the same time they are 
used as powerful rhetoric tools to reaffirm anti-Japanese sentiments of the population. On 
the other hand, since these exact notions are already fairly institutionalized by the 
patriotic education campaign and the main historical narrative presented by the CCP, the 
Chinese leadership cannot refrain from criticizing Japan for the wrongdoings. This could 
be interpreted as leadership’s weakness and could result in public protests. In a similar 
way, the Japanese leadership, whose part of the electorate derives from right-wing 
nationalistic supporters, cannot discard the importance of the observance entirely, as it 
could result in protests as well.  
!
! !
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The method presented in this work was aimed to address one of the issues in 
Sino-Japanese relations from a micro-level, culture-specific perspective, and present how 
it relates to the macro-level, system-specific approach. The constructivist epistemology 
allows for the demonstration of how subjects can be related to systems, and how the 
systems reciprocally shape the subjects. The comprehension of this process helps to 
understand the current political situation in regard to ideological disputes in Sino-
Japanese relations and gives possible guidelines for the interpretations and predictions of 
future developments. By analyzing the different rhetorical attributions towards a shared 
collective symbol in the form of Yasukuni Shrine, one can observe the ideologies behind 
them. This thesis does not provide an answer to how to solve the issue of Yasukuni 
Shrine in Sino-Japanese relations – on the contrary – it points out the reasons for which 
such a solution is not possible, namely the axiological nature of the dispute. At the same 
time, by observing the extremist’s arguments on both sides of the dispute, we can analyze 
the possible way in which the worse-case scenarios could develop. The same way that the 
collective symbols are part of larger system, the Yasukuni dispute is also just one 
manifestation of the complex interactions between the East Asian powers. This could be 
observed in further detail in Chapter 6. The analysis of articles from People’s Daily 
showed precisely how the Chinese side evokes other unresolved issues that are part of the 
disputes between the two countries. Yasukuni shrine is the most populistic and rhetorical 
one, and thus it gives the most substantial amount of data for the purposes of an analysis. 
The Class-A War Criminals enshrined at the site just add additional ideological 
68 
!
references for the opponents of the shrine’s observance. Chinese harsh rhetoric and 
increasing assertiveness, on the other hand, aid the supporters of the shrine’s observation 
to construct arguments against foreign interference into domestic policies and issues. In 
the end the dispute relates to, and creates anew, cultural references shared by entire 
populations, which have to be taken into account by their leadership. Even if in the 21st 
century the globalized international arena is not made only from nation-states, and it 
includes international organizations, actors, and corporations, nevertheless states play an 
important role in it. Since states are the political/communicative representation of the 
cultural/social – nation, the ideological disputes grounded in nationalism, may have more 
importance than strictly materialistic incentives.  
The interjections of different sub-systems of the overarching social system are not 
inherent but rather are constantly shaped. The current way in which this process occurs in 
Sino-Japanese relations is aimed towards further antagonisms in public opinions and 
collective identities. Although by itself this situation may not necessarily be sufficient to 
ignite militaristic conflicts, as the neorealists are correct to attribute importance to 
materialistic variables, and the global interdependence advocated by neoliberals does 
play an important role in balancing the power around the world, it is nevertheless 
alarming how some of the deeply-rooted collective symbols are brought to the 
international discourse between the two countries. If the leadership wants to hold the 
power in the domestic arena, the state’s actions have to be justified by its population. For 
example, the Tokugawa regime and the Qing Empire were eventually overthrown by 
their populations, exactly because they could not fulfill their role of satisfactory 
government. Likewise, the United States did not participate in WWII until a reason – the 
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Pearl Harbor incident –finally gave them a justification that would convince the 
American populace of the righteousness of the war. Similarly, the Iraq War (2003-2011) 
would not have been possible if not for the support of the American population in 
pursuing some of the axiological beliefs – democracy, freedom, and peace. The way that 
these beliefs have been approached ideologically is question of rhetorical strength and 
proper presentation of the ideology. The assumption that actors on the international arena 
are rational and will act only towards securing their own materialistic interests is also 
quite idealistic. After all, many of the conflicts in the history of the world’s civilization 
were based on ideological premises. Of course, materialistic gain would be part of the 
stake as well, but not necessarily the trigger. In the end, war always brings loss, but it 
also opens new opportunities – “where two quarrel, the third wins.”  
Finally, the approach used in this thesis shows the cyclical relation between states 
and their nations in the autopoietic - reciprocal - creation of each other. It may seem that 
in the final account the Yasukuni issue cannot be solved because of the fact that once an 
idea enters the system’s cycle, it is constantly reproduced by the system in order to 
sustain itself. But as it was pointed out in this thesis, the beginning of this process starts 
from institutionalization of a certain communicative, discursive process, and thus even if 
there seem to not be enough incentives to change the discourse and aim for 
reconciliation, we can only hope that this will eventually become a final interest in the 
international arena, regardless of power, ideologies, and interdependence. For this 
purpose research of the topic in both languages, and a more detailed analysis of the 
different arguments of the proponents and the opponents would bring a better linguistic 
picture of the possible gravity of the current shape of the ideological disputes.  
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